Insurance--Effect of Mistatement of Ownership on Rights of Mortgagee under Standard Mortgagee Clause by Brotman, Helen L.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 6 
Number 1 Volume 6, December 1931, Number 1 Article 16 
June 2014 
Insurance--Effect of Mistatement of Ownership on Rights of 
Mortgagee under Standard Mortgagee Clause 
Helen L. Brotman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Brotman, Helen L. (1931) "Insurance--Effect of Mistatement of Ownership on Rights of Mortgagee under 
Standard Mortgagee Clause," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 6 : No. 1 , Article 16. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol6/iss1/16 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
basic difference between a presumption of law and an inference. A
presumption of law is an inference that the jury must make,1 4 viz.,
they must presume the defendant is innocent, but while so presum-
ing they may infer that the deceased committed suicide. But the
mere fact that such inference may be made does not of itself entitle
the defendant to a charge that they, the jury, must so infer.
The use of a presumption of suicide would also be contrary to
the fundamental reason which prompted its introduction into the
law of evidence. Human experience has taught us that when certain
facts are shown to exist, we may presume the existence of other
facts which are known generally to be concomitant with the first
facts.' 5 The universal knowledge of the love of life has led to
the presumption that one does not commit suicide.' 6 What facts
are within our knowledge which would lead us to presume that a
person would commit suicide? There are none, indeed the evidence
is all to the contrary, and the only argument for it proceeds from
another presumption, that of innocence. If a jury is not permitted
to draw inferences from inferences, it should not be ordered to
build presumptions on presumptions.
THOMAS M. MCDADE.
INSURANCE-EFFECT OF MISSTATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP ON RIGHTS
OF MORTGAGEE UNDER STANDARD MORTGAGEE CLAUSE.
The primary purpose of insurance under a mortgagee clause
is to insure the equitable interest of the mortgagee, who, in practi-
cally all instances, does not occupy the insured premises. The own-
ership of the premises may be transferred without his consent.
While a mortgagee can take out a separate policy on his interest,
insurance companies have prepared mortgagee clauses to protect
the interest of the mortgagee. In the recent case of Goldstein v.
National Liberty Insurance Company of America, et al.,' the Court
of Appeals was confronted with the problem of deciding whether
or not a mortgagee under a mortgagee clause would be prevented
from recovering for a fire loss, where the ownership of the prem-
ises was misrepresented in a policy which provided for its voidance
if the interest of the insured were other than unconditional and
sole ownership.
"Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U. S. 485, 1 Sup. Ct. 582,
27 L. ed. 337 (1882); Platt v. Elias, 186 N. Y. 374, 79 N. E. 1 (1906);
(1926) 11 CORN. L. Q. 20. For a critical analysis of this definition see Thayer,
Presumptiot and the Law of Evidence (1889) 3 HARV. L. Rnv. 148 et seq.;
HAYES, CASES ON EVIDENCE (1898) 79.
' Spra note 14.10Supra note 10.
1256 N. Y. 26, 175 N. E. 359 (1931).
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In that case, the mortgagee of real property brought an action
against the insurer to recover for a fire loss to the demised prem-
ises. A prior owner of the premises executed and delivered to
plaintiff's assignor a mortgage in the principal sum of $25,000. The
mortgage was assigned to plaintiff on November 24, 1926. There-
after and on March 4, 1927, the premises were conveyed to Abraham
B. Schlowsky, and on August 9, 1927, at the instance of the owner,
a policy of fire insurance was issued by the National Liberty In-
surance Company of America, in which policy the buildings were
described as "in course of construction" and the owner of the de-
mised premises was stated to be Abraham B. Schlowsky, Inc. At-
tached to the policy was a standard mortgagee clause, as follows:
"Loss or damage, if any, under this policy, shall be payable
to M. J. Goldstein, as mortgagee (or trustee) as interest may
appear, and this insurance, as to the interest of the mort-
gagee (or trustee) only therein shall not be invalidated by
any act or neglect of the Mortgagor or owner of the within
described property, nor by any foreclosure or other pro-
ceedings or notice of sale relating to the property, nor by
any change in the title or ownership of the property, nor by
the occupation of the premises for purposes more hazardous
than are permitted by this policy; PROVIDED, that in case
the mortgagor or owner shall neglect to pay any premium
due under this policy, the mortgagee (or trustee) shall, on
demand, pay the same."
The policy also contained a provision that it should be void "if the
interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole owner-
ship." From the evidence adduced at the trial, it appeared that the
corporation, Abraham B. Schlowsky, Inc., stated to be the owner
in the policy of insurance, was controlled by Abraham B. Schlowsky,
who owned 98% of the stock therein, and that he, his wife and his
secretary were the sole officers, directors and stockholders of the
corporation. The trial Court dismissed the complaint, 2 holding that
the policy was void by reason of breach of the warranty that the
buildings were in "course of construction," as represented in the
policy. The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the trial
Court 3 on the ground that "there were facts presented which re-
quired the submission of the case to the jury." On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division which
reversed the judgment of the trial Court, holding that a policy of
fire insurance in the standard form, which is void as to the owner
because of his breach of warranty as to ownership and occupancy,
may under the standard mortgagee clause be valid as to a mortgagee.
2 134 Misc. 90, 234 N. Y. Supp. 40 (1928).228 App. Div. 833, 240 N. Y. Supp. 883 (2nd Dept. 1930).
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In 1881 the Court of Appeals, in the case of Graham v. Fire-
man's Insurance Company,4 held that a mortgagee could not re-
cover under a mortgagee clause where there was a misrepresentation
as to ownership in the policy of insurance. The Court refused to
apply that rule to the instant case. The rule in the Graham case
was applied correctly there, because the owner of the insured prem-
ises was an infant three years of age with no general guardian, and
it follows that a misrepresentation as to the ownership of the in-
sured premises was not an act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner
of the property, within the meaning of the mortgagee clause, which
clearly contemplated a case where the owner could act or could
neglect, and not a case where the policy was issued in the name of
an infant, who by reason of its incapacity, could not furnish any
protection to the company. In the instant case, we have the act of
the owner of the property in taking out the insurance in the cor-
porate name instead of his own name, and such act comes clearly
within the language of the mortgagee clause. But there is even a
more cogent reason for refusing to apply the old rule. In the Graham
case, the representations as to ownership of the property were made
by the agent of the mortgagee, who applied for the policies of in-
surance, and not by the insured. In the instant case, the obligation
of the owner to protect the mortgagee's interest in the property
by insurance did not constitute the owner, who appears to have been
an insurance broker, the agent of the mortgagee in procuring the
insurance, and any misrepresentations that were made in procuring
the insurance were not in effect made by the mortgagee.
Omitting for a moment consideration of the contract between
the insurer and the mortgagee, we find authority for the view that
even as to the insured there was no breach of the warranty of
"unconditional and sole ownership." In a case before the Texas
Commission of Appeals,5 where the property insured was owned
by an individual who held 98% of the stock of the company named
in the policy as the insured, it was held that there was no breach
of the "ownership interest" provision in the policy. Another case
decided in the same state C held that the insured could recover for
a fire loss sustained, although the conveyance to him was not by
the corporate owner, but by the owner of substantially all the stock.
The New York Court of Appeals has held 7 that a policy was not
invalidated, where from the facts it appeared that insurance was
taken out in the name of a partnership, the policy containing a pro-
vision that the insurance would be void if the interest of the insured
should be other than unconditional and sole ownership, and where
'9 Daly 341, aff'd, 87 N. Y. 69 (1881).
' Pacific Fire Insurance Co. v. John E. Morris, 12 S. W. (2d) 971 (1929).
6Phoenix Assurance Co. et al. v. Deavenport, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 283,
41 S. W. 399 (1897).
Wood v. American Fire Insurance Co., 78 Hun 109, aff'd, 149 N. Y. 382,
44 N. E. 80 (1896).
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it appeared that before the insurance in question was written, one
of the members of the firm had made an assignment for the benefit
of creditors and the assignee had assigned the partnership interest
to a third person. It is of interest to note in this connection that
policies have been held valid although no particular person was
named therein as insured,s the validity of contracts of insurance
being upheld even under such circumstances.
As regards the contract with the mortgagee, it is submitted
that the insurance contract would not be forfeited or invalidated
if the interest of the insured named in the policy was not sole and
unconditional, for it is provided in the mortgagee clause that the
mortgagee's interest shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect
of the owner or mortgagor. In view of this provision of the mort-
gagee clause, it is apparent that the insurer in covering the risk as
to the mortgagee under the mortgagee clause did not intend to
make the character of the ownership of the insured named in the
policy a condition of the contract with the mortgagee. The owner-
ship and possession of the premises when the policy was issued
were of no more importance to the insurer than the subsequent
ownership and possession. They are conditions of liability as to
the owner, but plainly none of them was intended to affect the
mortgagee. The mortgagee made no representations as to the own-
ership of the property, and the insurer in issuing the policy accepted
the ownership recited in the policy. The representations as to the
ownership contained in the policy proper should not be read into
and made a part of the contract of insurance with the mortgagee
contained in the mortgagee clause. This view has been adopted by
a Federal Court,9 which held that although there was a breach
of the warranty of sole and unconditional ownership which ren-
dered the policy void as to the individuals named as insureds in the
policy, yet the policy was not invalidated as to the mortgagee under
a mortgagee clause. The standard mortgagee clause creates an in-
dependent contract of insurance for the separate benefit of the mort-
gagee which if valid and enforceable in its inception so con-
tinues until rendered invalid by a subsequent act or neglect of the
mortgagee.' 0
The mortgagee clause is prepared by the insurer, and if the
unconditional and sole ownership of the insured premises by the
party named as insured in the policy is to be a condition precedent
to the contract of insurance with the mortgagee covered by the
mortgagee clause, the insurer should so provide. The insurer should
not be allowed to avoid liability upon a technical ground which in
no way pertains to the risk insured under the mortgagee clause.
' Clinton v. Hope Insurance Company, 51 Barb. 647, aff'd, 45 N. Y.
454 (1871).
'Syndicate Insurance Co. v. Bohn, 65 Fed. 165 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894).
10 Grosvenor v. Atlantic Fire Insurance Co., 12 Super. (5 Duer) 517, rev'd,
17 N. Y. 391 (1858).
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In the instant case we find no inconsistency between the provisions
of the policy issued to the insured and those of the attached mort-
gagee clause, but if any inconsistency exists, the interpretation
which is more favorable to the mortgagee will control.
In the case of Hastings, et al. v. Westchester Fire Insurance
Company," cited with approval by the Courts over a span of years,' 2
and recently used as authority by the Court of Appeals in a deci-
sion written by that Court,' 3 it was held that the mortgagee clause
operated as an independent insurance of the mortgagees' interest,
giving the mortgagees the same benefit as if a separate policy of
insurance had been procured, free from the conditions imposed upon
the owner.
There is no weight to the contention that the mortgagee clause
is predicated upon a policy valid in its inception and does not apply
to a policy void as to the insured by reason of breach of warranty
as to ownership or nature of occupancy. That there is sufficient
consideration for a separate and independent contract of insurance
between the insurer and the mortgagee contained in the mortgagee
clause attached to the policy, even though as to the insured the
policy may be invalid for breach of warranty as to the sole and
unconditional ownership of the property, is borne out by a number
of decisions 14 touching on the subject. It has been held in all
jurisdictions '5 that any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner
after the issuance of the policy covering the interest of the insured
will not invalidate the insurance contract covering the mortgagee's
interest in the mortgagee clause. The 'Courts have held in any
' Hastings, et al. v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 12 Hun 416, aff'd,
73 N. Y. 141 (1878).
12 Cole v. Germania Fire Insurance Co., 99 N. Y. 36, 1 N. E. 38 (1885);
Eddy v. London Assurance Corp., 65 Hun 307, aff'd, 143 N. Y. 311, 38 N. E.
307 (1894).
'Matter of Aioss v. Sardo, et al., 223 App. Div. 201, 227 N. Y. Supp. 708,
aff'd, 249 N. Y. 270, 164 N. E. 48 (1928).
" Syndicate Insurance Co. v. Bohn, supra note 9; Planters' Mutual Insur-
ance Assn. v. Southern Savings Fund & Loan Co.. 68 Ark. 8, 56 S. W. 443
(1900); Insurance Company of N. A. v. Martin, 151 Ind. 209, 51 N. E. 361
(1898); Peoples Savings Bank v. Retail Merchants Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
146 Iowa 536, 123 N. W. 198 (1909); Reed v. Fireman's Insurance Co., 81
N. J. L. 523, 80 Atl. 462 (1911); Germania Fire Insurance Co. of N. Y. v.
Bally, 90 Ariz. 580, 173 Pac. 1052 (1918) ; Hastings, et al. v. Westchester Fire
Insurance Co., supra note 11.
5 Syndicate Insurance Co. v. Bohn, suqpra note 9; Fire Assn. of Philadel-
phia v. Evansville Brewing Assn., 73 Fla. 904, 75 So. 196 (1917) ; Peoples
Savings Bank v. Retail Merchants Mutual Fire Insurance Co., supra note 14;
Magoun v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 86 Minn. 486, 91 N. W. 5 (1902);
Bacot v. Phenix Insurance Co., 96 Miss. 223, 50 So. 729 (1909); Burns v.
Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 224 S. W. (Mo. App.) 96 (1920) ; No. British
& Mercantile Insurance Co. v. Bohn, et al., 49 Neb. 572, 68 N. W. 942 (1896) ;
Reed v. Fireman's Insurance Co., su pra note 9; Federal Land Bank v. Atlas
Assurance Co., 188 N. C. 747, 125 S. E. 631 (1924) ; Smith v. Union Insurance
Co., et al., 25 R. I. 260, 55 Atl. 715 (1903).
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number of cases 16 that the mortgagee's contract of insurance under
the mortgagee clause is not invalidated by breach of warranty by
owner or mortgagor committed before or at the time the policy
was issued, although such breach voided the policy as to the insured.
In the Hastings case, Rapallo, J., in his concurring opinion, referring
to the mortgagee clause, said:
"Although the clause might be construed so as to exempt
the mortgagees from the consequences only of acts of the
owners done after the making of the agreement, I do not
think, in view of its apparent purpose, that any such distinc-
tion was intended."
One of our foremost writers 17 on the law of insurance holds that
the mortgagee clause, making the mortgagee the payee and stipu-
lating that the insurance should not be invalidated by the mortgagor's
acts, constitutes an independent contract between mortgagee and in-
surer, and in such case, the subject matter of insurance is the mort-
gagee's insurable interest, and not the real estate; and the risk will
not be avoided by any acts of the mortgagor, whether done prior
or subsequent to, or at the time of the issuance of the policy.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is founded not only on
good law but sound reason. If it were not for the holding in the
instant case, what safeguards would a mortgagee have, if unknown
to him, a policy covering his interest could be avoided by an insurer
for misrepresentations or concealments by an owner? Surely, it
cannot be said that a mortgagee is under obligation constantly to
follow the acts of an owner so as to inform himself and the insurer
of any breach by an owner of his warranties or representations in
the policy between him and an insurer. Under a mortgagee clause,
the contract is primarily between a mortgagee and an insurer, and
acts of an owner should not be allowed to vitiate or interfere with
such a contract.
HELEN L. BROTMAN.
WORI MEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-EMPLOYER's LIABILITY TO
CONTRIBUTION FOR SUBSEQUENT ACCIDENT.
The right of an employee to receive compensation from his
employer depends upon whether the injury resulted from accident
arising out of the employment. Frequently the accident results from
" Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 167 Minn. 146, 208 N. W.
816 (1926); Hanover Fire Ins. Co., et al. v. Bobn, 48 Neb. 743, 67 N. W. 774
(1896) ; Federal Land Bank v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co., 187 N. C.
97, 121 S. E. 37 (1924); Fayetteville Building & Loan Assn. v. Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 105 W. Va. 147, 141 S. E. 634 (1928).172 JoYCE, INSURANCE (1918) §2795.
